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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 1995, a notice titled "Naughty Oklahoma T-
shirts" appeared on an America Online ("AOL") bulletin board.1 The
notice advertised T-shirts with slogans such as "Visit Oklahoma...
It's a BLAST!" and "Putting the kids to bed ... Oklahoma 1995."2
In short, the notice glorified the Oklahoma City bombings of 1995,
which killed 168 people. 3 Under the only known identity of "Ken
ZZ03," 4 the author invited readers to call "Ken" at the listed phone
number, which belonged to a Mr. Kenneth Zeran. 5 While Mr. Ze-
ran's first name was in fact Ken, Mr. Zeran was not responsible for
posting the notice. 6 Rather, the bogus notice was part of a vicious
prank played upon Mr. Zeran. 7 As a result of this prank, Mr. Zeran
received a series of angry, intimidating phone calls, including some
death threats.8 The advertisement notice also had a serious, nega-
tive impact upon Mr. Zeran's business, 9 which was dependent upon
his ability to communicate by telephone.10 The constant, offensive
1. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (E.D. Va. 1997).
2. Id. at 1127 n.3.
3. Id. at 1126.




8. Id. By April 30, just five days after the posting of the first notice, Mr. Zeran received an
abusive phone call about every two minutes. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th
Cir. 1997).
9. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1127. At the time, Mr. Zeran operated a publishing business from
his home in Seattle, Washington. Id. at 1127 n.4.
10. Id. at 1127. Mr. Zeran could not change his phone number because his business relied
upon the availability of his current phone number to the public. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
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phone calls severely interrupted Mr. Zeran's work, thereby causing
him both emotional and economic suffering."
Mr. Zeran immediately contacted AOL and asked them to
remove the bogus advertisement, informing AOL of the harm that it
was causing him. 12 AOL promptly complied with Mr. Zeran's re-
quest. 13 The next day, however, a second notice, just as vulgar as
the first, appeared on AOL's bulletin board.14 Again, Mr. Zeran de-
manded that AOL remove the notice and take steps to block future
false notices bearing his name and phone number.15 While AOL in-
formed Mr. Zeran that they were taking steps to delete the notice
and terminate the account that was posting the notices, 16 a series of
these offensive notices continued to appear on AOL through May 1,
1995.17 As a result, the threatening and abusive phone calls per-
sisted long after the notices were finally removed.' 8
About a year later, Mr. Zeran decided to seek redress for the
injuries that he had suffered as a result of the defamatory state-
ments 19 posted on AOL.20 In April 1996, Mr. Zeran sued AOL for
failing to respond adequately to the bogus notices posted on its bul-
letin board after he informed AOL that the notices were false and
defamatory. 21 In response to Mr. Zeran's claim, the District Court of
the Eastern District of Virginia granted, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, AOL immunity from any liability for the defamatory no-
tices under § 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
11. See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1127-28.
12. Id. at 1127.
13. Id.
14. Id. The second notice declared that T-shirts from the previous notice had "SOLD OUT,"
and announced that new T-shirt slogans were available. Id. Among the new advertised slogans
were "Finally a day care center that keeps the kids quiet-Oklahoma 1995" and "Forget the
rescue, let the maggots take over-Oklahoma 1995." Id. at 1127 n.5.
15. Id. at 1127.
16. Id. at 1127-28.
17. Id. at 1128. The effect of the AOL notices was magnified when an Oklahoma City radio
broadcaster for KRXO read the slogans from the notices on the air and encouraged listeners to
call "Ken" at the listed phone number. Id.
18. Id. The threatening phone calls diminished to approximately fifteen phone calls a day
after May 15, 1995. Id.
19. Black's Law Dictionary defines a defamatory statement as "a statement that tends to in-
jure the reputation of a person referred to in it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 428 (7th ed. 1999).
20. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1128.
21. Id. First, Zeran filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma against the radio station, KRXO, on January 4, 1996, for broadcasting the notices on
the air. Id. Then, in April 1996, Zeran filed a separate action against AOL in the same court. Id.
In response, AOL filed a motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia, where
AOL is headquartered. Id. The motion was granted, and Zeran's suit against AOL was tried in
Virginia. Id.
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(the "CDA"). 22 Thus, Mr. Zeran lost his case and was provided no
remedy or compensation for the harm he suffered as a result of the
defamatory notices posted about him on AOL.
Mr. Zeran is not alone; his case exemplifies a problem that is
becoming more and more common in today's society as the Internet
becomes increasingly pervasive. Albeit an extreme example, Mr.
Zeran's case nonetheless illustrates the gravity of the problem of
defamation over the Internet and the severity of the harm that it
can cause. These instances of so-called third-party Internet defama-
tion are uniquely problematic because Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") are usually granted immunity from any liability, leaving
the plaintiff with no remedy. In the past five years, there has been
an influx of cases in which unknown third parties have posted de-
famatory statements over the Internet through message boards,
23
chat rooms, 24 or e-mail. 25 The victims of this type of third-party
defamation 26 often suffer real harm, such as termination or loss of
reputation, as a direct result of the false statements made about
them. Increasingly, people are opting to sue their ISP,27 such as
AOL, for posting these allegedly defamatory statements, since the
actual defamers are usually unknown. 28 Because the Internet is a
22. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997); Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at
1137.
23. A message board is an electronic bulletin board displayed over the Internet that allows
computer users to post messages to others, or write comments about a particular subject matter.
See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. 1999). Message boards are often
analogized to the editorial pages of newspapers. See id.
24. A chat room is an Internet forum in which computer users can log on and "chat" with or
correspond with other users who are online and are in the chat room at the same time. See id. at
542 n.4.
25. E-mail is a form of communication used over the Internet in which a computer user can
send electronic messages to another user through accounts established by an ISP. See id. at 541.
26. Third-party defamation cases are distinguishable from other defamation cases because
third-party defamation cases involve suing someone other than the actual defamer, such as an
ISP or a newspaper. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-31. In third-party defamation cases, the
defamer is often unknown, and therefore, the plaintiffs opt to sue the disseminator of the de-
famatory material. See id.
27. An ISP is a commercial service that offers access to a computer network and organiza-
tional software, which allows subscribers to interconnect easily with other computer networks on
the Internet. See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1126 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38
(E.D. Pa. 1996)). ISPs are also referred to as OSPs, online service providers. See id. at 1126 n.1.
28. Some choose to sue the ISP in order to force it to release information about the identity
of the unknown defamer, and thereby proceed in a defamation suit against that person. See
generally Does v. Hvide, No. 99-22831 (Fla. Cir. Ct.), cert denied, 770 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist, Ct.
App. 2000) (denying review of a lower court's ruling that Yahoo! and AOL must reveal the iden-
tity of eight anonymous John Doe defendants in a defamation case in which the plaintiff alleged
that he got fired from his job because the defendants posted defamatory statements about him on
their message boards); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
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recent, complex medium that cannot be neatly reconciled with es-
tablished common law defamation principles, these Internet defa-
mation cases add a new dimension to existing defamation law, and
make the analysis more complicated.
Under traditional defamation law, liability may be imposed
upon the creator of a defamatory statement, as well as on the dis-
seminator of the defamatory material. 29 There are currently three
mediums of communication over which defamation may be dissemi-
nated: newspapers (publishers); libraries, bookstores, and news
vendors (distributors); and telephone companies (common carriers).
Existing case law in this area typically focuses on the issue of con-
trol.30 In tort, control equals liability.31 For example, as the amount
of control that the disseminator has over the material increases, so
does the liability for the publishing of the defamation. 32 Accord-
ingly, newspapers are often subject to publisher liability for printed
defamation, or libel, because they have editorial control over what
is published.33 Telephone companies, on the other hand, generally
have no risk of liability for defamatory statements communicated
over phone lines because they have no control over what is said.34
Libraries, bookstores, and news vendors fall in between the two ex-
tremes of newspapers and telephone companies; 35 they are viewed
as distributors of the information that they carry and are only Ii-
2001) (rejecting a corporation's discovery request, which required the ISP to disclose the John
Doe defendants' identities in an online defamation); Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) (involving an anonymous corporation's request for a sub-
poena requiring AOL to disclose the identities of John Doe defendants who allegedly defamed the
corporation by publishing confidential, insider material on the ISP's chat room); Cohen v. John
Does, No. 99-5116, 1999 WL 1419239 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 1999) (involving plaintiff who first
sought to obtain information from Yahoo!, Inc. concerning the identity of the 100 John Doe de-
fendants who allegedly posted defamatory material about the plaintiff on Yahoo's message
board). Even when the defamer is known, some still choose to sue the ISP instead in an attempt
to sue an entity with deeper pockets and more capital. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of
Internet Service Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R.5th 169, 178-79 (2000).
29. See Jonathan A. Friedman & Francis M. Buono, Limiting Tort Liability for Online
Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Act, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 647, 650
(2000).
30. See Suman Mirmira, Prodigy Services Co., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 440 (2000).
31. See id. at 438-39.
32. See id.
33. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34. See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 648 (N.Y. 1974).
35. See Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc.,
521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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able for defamatory material if they had knowledge that the mate-
rial was defamatory before they distributed it. 36
As this Note will demonstrate, attempting to analogize ISPs
to the traditional common law defamation mediums can be prob-
lematic. While ISPs may share similarities with all three mediums,
they do not fit properly into any of the existing categories. As a re-
sult, it is difficult to determine which standard of defamation liabil-
ity should be applied to ISPs in Internet defamation cases. This dif-
ficulty mandates a need for clarification regarding how defamation
law should be implemented in the Internet context.
To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the question
of whether ISPs should be held liable for third-party defamation or
libel published over the Internet. Traditionally, lower courts have
addressed this issue using the established defamation common law
framework. 37 With the growth of technology and the expansion of
the Internet, however, Congress recognized a need to address the
issue of publisher liability for ISPs.38 In an attempt to promote
technology, and encourage ISPs to regulate content over the Inter-
net, Congress created § 230 of the CDA, which essentially immu-
nizes ISPs from publisher liability.39 Specifically, § 230(c) of the
CDA contains a "Good Samaritan" provision, which states that a
provider or user of an interactive computer service should not be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information provider. 40 The CDA defines an "interactive
computer service" as "any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by mul-
tiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems oper-
36. See Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 932; Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139; Lerman, 521 F. Supp. at
235.
37. See discussion infra Part III.A. For an explanation of established defamation law prin-
ciples, see infra Part II.
38. See infra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1999) (amending a statute originally enacted in 1996).
Congress passed the CDA in an attempt to protect minors from harmful material displayed over
the Internet, such as pornography. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-58 (1997). Congress
granted ISPs immunity from publisher liability in § 230(c) of the CDA with the purpose of en-
couraging ISPs to monitor content in order to prevent minors from being able to view objection-
able material over the Internet. § 230(c). While the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of
the CDA prohibiting transmission of obscene or indecent communications by means of telecom-
munications or through an ISP to persons under the age of eighteen, the constitutionality of the
immunity granted to ISPs under § 230(c) remains intact. See ACLU, 521 U.S. at 844 (striking
down certain provisions of the CDA because they constituted content-based restrictions on
speech in violation of the First Amendment).
40. § 230(c)(1).
652 [Vol. 55:647
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ated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions."41
Thus, under the CDA, an ISP qualifies as an interactive computer
service provider. 42
Since the passage of the CDA in 1996, lower courts have in-
terpreted § 230(c) as providing ISPs with "Good Samaritan" immu-
nity from publisher liability for third-party defamatory statements
posted over the Internet.43 Lower courts have applied this immunity
broadly for ISPs, as evidenced by the fact that since the CDA was
passed, there has not been a single case holding an ISP liable for
third-party defamatory material on the Internet. 44 This ISP immu-
nity has also been extended to cases in which the ISP has been in-
formed of the defamatory statements, but still fails to remove them
from the Internet. 45
This broad interpretation of the immunity granted to ISPs in
§ 230 of the CDA has led to a concern that the CDA immunity is
essentially becoming an absolute bar to a plaintiffs recovery. 46 If
ISPs are never held liable for third-party defamation published over
the Internet, particularly in cases in which the ISP had some con-
trol over the publishing or distribution of the materials, then the
plaintiff is left without a remedy. In order to avoid impeding the
development of technology, ISPs should continue to receive a broad
immunity under the CDA. In cases in which the ISP has been in-
formed of the defamation, but fails to remove the defamatory mate-
rial, however, ISPs should be liable under the theory of distributor
liability. This approach is not only consistent with § 230(c) and
common law defamation principles, but also balances the CDA's two
competing policies of promoting technology and ensuring that the
plaintiff is not left without a tort remedy. Furthermore, subjecting
ISPs to distributor liability is in line with the CDA's policy of en-
couraging content regulation over the Internet. If ISPs are immu-
nized from both publisher and distributor liability, and are never
held responsible for third-party defamation, then ISPs will have no
incentive to spend time and money regulating content.
In advocating this approach, this Note begins in Part II by
providing an overview of traditional defamation common law prin-
41. § 230(f)(2).
42. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1132 (E.D. Va. 1997).
43. See discussion infra Part III.B.
44. See discussion infra Part III.B.
45. See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1134.
46. See Mirmira, supra note 30, at 452-54; David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet,
61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 147-52 (1997).
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ciples. Part III details lower court decisions regarding defamation
in the Internet context and describes how lower courts have ana-
lyzed ISP liability for third-party defamation displayed on the
Internet. Part III also discusses cases decided under common law,
both before and after the passage of the CDA. Part IV then dis-
cusses the current problem created by lower courts' interpretations
of the CDA's "Good Samaritan" immunity granted to ISPs. Finally,
Part V poses a better solution to the problem of what type of liabil-
ity ISPs should be subjected to in third-party Internet defamation
claims. This solution entails preserving distributor liability for
ISPs. In support of this solution, this section also includes a more
accurate interpretation of § 230(c), an analysis regarding the value
of preserving distributor liability for ISPs, a discussion emphasiz-
ing the importance of balancing crucial policy matters, and analo-
gizes copyright law to defamation law in the Internet context.
II. TRADITIONAL DEFAMATION LAW
Before addressing whether ISPs should be held liable for
third party defamation published over the Internet, it is first neces-
sary to understand the contemporary framework of defamation law.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a defamatory communi-
cation as one that "tends ... to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him."47 Defamation can be
referred to as either libel or slander. 48 Libel consists of written or
printed publication of defamatory material that is embodied in
physical form, or any other form of communication, that has the
potentially harmful characteristics of written or printed words. 49
Slander, on the other hand, consists of the publication of defama-
tory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures, or by any other
type of communication, other than those that are included in the
definition of libel. 50 For example, if A prepares a wax figure that is
a recognizable representation of B and places it among other effi-
gies of famous murderers in "The Chamber of Horrors," where it is
seen by a number of people, A has just libeled B.51 A's actions can-
not be characterized as slander because the publication of the de-
famatory material is embodied in a physical form and is not transi-
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
48. See id. § 568.
49. Id. § 568(1).
50. Id. § 568(2).
51. Id. § 568 illus. 3.
654 [Vol. 55:647
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tory in nature. 52 Furthermore, three factors that make published
material libel rather than slander are: (1) the deliberate and pre-
meditated character of the publication, (2) the wide area of dis-
semination, and (3) the persistence of the defamation.
53
Defamation law is primarily designed to protect an individ-
ual's reputation. 54 For example, if defamatory material has not been
communicated to a third party, then there is no loss of reputation,
and therefore, no cause of action. 55 The common law elements nec-
essary to establish a defamation cause of action are: (1) a false and
defamatory statement concerning another, (2) an unprivileged pub-
lication to a third party,56 (3) fault amounting to at least negligence
on the part of the publisher, and (4) the existence of actual harm.
57
More specifically, in libel cases, publication of the defamatory ma-
terial in the form of written or printed words is essential to finding
liability. 58 Section 577 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that publication of defamatory matter "is . . . communication inten-
tionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person de-
famed."5 9 Furthermore, section 577 indicates that "one who inten-
tionally and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that
he knows to be exhibited on property in his possession or on an en-
tity that is within his control is subject to liability for its continued
publication."60 Thus, one who republishes defamatory material over
which he has control assumes liability equal to that of the original
publisher.
61
Prior to 1964, defamation was considered to be a strict liabil-
ity tort. 62 In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court estab-
52. See id. § 568(1)-(2).
53. Id. § 568(3). Accordingly, the Internet publication of defamatory statements made by an
unknown third party qualifies as libel because it is embodied in a physical form on the Internet,
is widely disseminated, is premeditated and deliberate, and is persistent in character. Id. § 568
cmt. d; see also Sylvia Khatcherian, Liability on the Internet, N.Y. ST. B.J., May/June 1996, at 34,
36 (indicating that defamatory statements published over the Internet are libelous statements).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. b (1977). "[R]eputation is the estimation in
which one's character is held by his neighbors or associates." Id.
55. Id.
56. An unprivileged publication refers to one that is not based upon the consent of the per-
son affected or one that is not justifiable or necessary to the protection of an important interest.
Id. § 558.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 577 cmt. a; see also id. § 558 (stating the elements of a defamation cause of action).
59. Id. § 577(1).
60. Id. § 577(2).
61. Id.; see also Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (referring to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 577-578 (1977)).
62. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 665 n.15. A strict liability tort can be defined
as a tort in which the liability "does not depend on actual negligence or an intent-to harm," but is
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lished that the-First Amendment demands a minimum constitu-
tional fault standard of "actual malice"63 for defamation claims in-
volving public figures. 64 Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the
Court established a minimum fault standard of negligence for
claims brought by private figures 65 regarding matters of public con-
cern. 66 The Court left the question open for individual states to de-
cide which standard to impose in cases involving claims brought by
private figures involving private matters.67 The Court stated that
unless the state law indicated otherwise, a standard of negligence,
instead of actual malice, could be used for private claims involving
private matters.
68
Generally, common law recognizes three different standards
of liability for the dissemination of defamatory material: publisher
liability, distributor liability, and common carrier liability. 69 The
duty of care and liability increases as the discretion that the dis-
seminator has over the published information increases. 70 Accord-
ingly, publishers generally experience the greatest amount of liabil-
ity, while common carriers experience the least. 7'
Publisher 72 liability may be attributed to any entity that ex-
ercises a high degree of editorial content control over the dissemi-
nation of defamatory material.73 A newspaper serves as a common
example of a medium that is often subject to publisher liability be-
cause a newspaper usually exercises editorial control over what is
instead based on the breach of a duty that is imposed by the law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926
(7th ed. 1999).
63. "Actual malice" means that the defendant had knowledge that the statement was false,
or recklessly disregarded whether or not the statement was false. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
64. See id. at 254 (requiring the plaintiff, a police chief, to demonstrate that a newspaper
acted with actual malice in printing an advertisement that described plaintiffs allegedly racist
acts); see also Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 650 n.15.
65. A private figure is distinguished from a public figure because a public figure is one who
is known to "thrust himself to the forefront of the particular controversy" that gave rise to the
defamation, while a private figure does not thrust himself to the forefront of the controversy.
Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Just because a per-
son is successful or popular does not mean that he is a public figure. Id.
66. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974); see also Friedman & Buono, supra
note 29, at 650 n.15.
67. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 749-50 (1985).
68. See id.
69. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 650; see also Mirmira, supra note 30, at 438.
70. See Mirmira, supra note 30, at 438-39.
71. See id.
72. "A 'publisher' is an entity, such as a book or newspaper publisher, who is responsible for
the creation or editing of content in a publication." Sheridan, supra note 46, at 153.
73. See id.
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published.74 A publisher has an obligation to monitor the content of
its publications, and therefore, is held liable for any third-party
defamation contained in the publication, even if the defamation was
simply an oversight or was not intended.75 For example, a newspa-
per can be held liable for defamation if it publishes a letter to the
editor that contains false and defamatory statements.
76
Distributor 77 liability may be attributed to any entity that
distributes, but does not exercise editorial control over, defamatory
material, such as a news vendor, bookstore, or library. 78 A distribu-
tor can be characterized as an entity that transmits or delivers in-
formation that is created or published by a third party. 79 Distribu-
tors are only held liable if they knew or had reason to know of the
defamation.80
Lastly, common carrier liability applies to any entity that
acts as a passive conduit for the transmission of defamatory mate-
rial.8 ' Thus, even if it knew or had reason to know of the defama-
tion, it may escape liability for defamation due to its lack of edito-
rial control over the material.8 2 For example, in Anderson v. New
York Telephone Co., the New York Court of Appeals indicated that
even when a court characterizes a common carrier, such as a tele-
phone company, as a publisher, the common carrier should be enti-
tled to qualified immunity from liability according to the common
law exception for actual malice.83 Thus, common carriers are gener-
ally immune from liability for third-party defamation.
8 4
The common carrier is clearly distinguishable from the other
two categories of disseminators because it lacks discretion over the
published material.8 5 It is not as easy, however, to tell the differ-
74. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 260-65 (1964).
75. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 650.
76. Id.
77. A "distributor" is an entity, such as a library or bookseller, which disseminates a publi-
cation created by a third party to the public. Sheridan, supra note 46, at 150.
78. See Auvil v.CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1992); Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc.,
521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1), § 581 cmts. b, d, e (1977).
80. See Auvil, 800 F. Supp. at 932; Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 139; Lerman, 521 F. Supp.
at 235.
81. Examples of common carriers are telephone companies and telegraph companies. See
Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d 740, 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
82. See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co, 320 N.E.2d 647, 648 (N.Y. 1974).
83. See id.; see also Anderson, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 752-53 (indicating that the common law ex-
ception for malice exempts a common carrier from liability for delivering libelous messages
unless the plaintiff furnishes evidence of actual malice, or bad faith, on the part of the carrier).
84. See Anderson, 320 N.E.2d at 648.
85. See id.
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ence between a publisher and a distributor. A publisher is often re-
ferred to as a primary publisher because he is the one who has edi-
torial control over the content of the publication.8 6 A distributor, on
the other hand, is sometimes called the secondary publisher, or "re-
publisher," because he simply makes the material available to oth-
ers, but is not involved with the creative or editorial processes.8 7 A
distributor does, however, have the ability to remove defamatory
material from distribution once it has knowledge of a publication's
defamatory nature.88 This distinction between publisher and dis-
tributor can become blurred, however, because an entity, such as a
newspaper or magazine, which is commonly considered a publisher,
can be held liable as either a primary publisher or a secondary pub-
lisher of information.8 9 For example, a television network 90 is re-
sponsible for creating the content that it broadcasts and may there-
fore be found liable as a publisher of defamatory material.91 A net-
work affiliate, however, is considered a distributor of defamatory
information because it does not create the content that it distrib-
utes, or exert editorial control over the substance of the material
displayed. 92 As the next section will demonstrate, the blurring of
the distinction between publisher and distributor is the main
source of confusion and controversy in third-party Internet defama-
tion cases.
III. DEFAMATION IN THE INTERNET CONTEXT
A. Cases Before § 230 of the CDA
Prior to the passage of the CDA in 1996, lower courts inter-
preted third-party Internet defamation cases using solely common
law defamation principles. 93 When assessing ISP liability for defa-
mation published over the Internet, the courts used a case-by-case
approach in which they tried to fit ISPs into one of the three tradi-
86. Sheridan, supra note 46, at 154.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Michelle J. Kane, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 486 (1999).
90. Id. at 501 n.19.
91. Id. (citing Coffey v. Midland Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1934)).
92. Id.
93. See generally Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that CompuServe was a distributor); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995
WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding that Prodigy was subject to publisher
liability).
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tional categories of publisher, distributor, or common carrier. 94 In
1991, for example, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the New
York Court of Appeals held that CompuServe qualified as a dis-
tributor of information, similar to a library or news vendor, and was
therefore only liable for defamation if it had knowledge that the
statements in question were defamatory. 95 The court reasoned that
a computerized database, like CompuServe's Computer Information
Service ("CIS"),96 on which the defamatory statements were made,
exemplifies an electronic for-profit library that carries a vast num-
ber of publications and collects usage and membership fees from its
subscribers in return for access to the publications. 97 Based on this
finding, and the relative lack of evidence that CompuServe was
aware of the defamatory statements posted on its CIS, the court
held that CompuServe was not liable under distributor liability
principles. 9
8
In the 1995 case of Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Ser-
vices Co., the Supreme Court of New York held that Prodigy, the
ISP, should be subjected to publisher liability, rather than distribu-
tor liability, for the defamatory information published on Prodigy's
bulletin boards. 99 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc., the plaintiff, an in-
vestment banking firm, sued Prodigy for publishing third-party de-
famatory statements made by unknown parties on its "Money Talk"
bulletin board. 100 The defamatory statements asserted that the
plaintiff committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with
94. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 139-40; Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *5.
95. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140. In Cubby, Inc., plaintiffs sued CompuServe for display-
ing libelous defamatory statements in the Rumorville publication that CompuServe carried as
part of the Journalism Forum in its computerized database, CompuServe Information System
("CIS"). Id. at 139.
96. CIS is an online general information service or "electronic library" that subscribers may
access from a personal computer for a membership fee. Id. at 137. CIS contains various forums
with different publications. Id. The Journalism Forum contains a publication called "Rumorville
USA," a daily newsletter that provides reports about broadcast journalism. Id. Rumorville is
published by Don Fitzpatrick Associates of San Francisco ("DFA"), which is headed by defendant
Don Fitzpatrick. Id. CompuServe has no direct employment or contractual relationship with
DFA or Fitzpatrick. Id. CompuServe also has no opportunity to review Rumorville's contents
before DFA uploads it into CompuServe's computer banks and receives no part of the fees that
DFA charges for access to Rumorville. Id.
97. Id. at 140.
98. Id.
99. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *3. It is important to note that the court in
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. court characterized publisher liability and distributor liability as two
distinct sources of defamation liability, rather than stating that they both belonged within the
broad category of publisher. Id.
100. Id. at *2.
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the initial public offering of Solomon-Page Ltd. stock. 10' The Strat-
ton Oakmont, Inc. court reasoned that Prodigy was liable as a pub-
lisher of defamatory content because: (1) Prodigy held itself out to
the public and its members as controlling the content of its com-
puter bulletin board and (2) the evidence indicated that Prodigy
exerted editorial control over its content through the use of an
automatic screening software program, content guidelines, and
board leaders hired to enforce these guidelines. 102
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. and Cubby, Inc. are two of the most
prominent Internet defamation decisions rendered prior to 1996.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., in particular, was significant because it
attributed publisher liability to an ISP in a third-party defamation
case, greatly increasing liability for ISPs, many of which operate
bulletin boards. 1° 3 The Stratton Oakmont, Inc. decision also raised
concern that imposing publisher liability upon ISPs would produce
large damage judgments for ISPs, forcing them to either shut down
their bulletin boards or suspend their services altogether, thereby
severely impeding technology. 104 Another concern that arose from
the Stratton Oakmont, Inc. decision was that it would create disin-
centives for ISPs to engage in self-regulation because they would be
subject to publisher liability every time they exerted editorial con-
trol over the content of third-party information. 10 5 In order to ad-
dress these concerns, Congress passed § 230(c) of the CDA, which
101. Id. Specifically, the alleged defamatory material included the following statements: "(a)
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. ('Stratton'), a securities investment banking firm, and Daniel Porush,
Stratton's President, committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with the initial pub-
lic offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.; (b) the Solomon-Page offering was a 'major criminal
fraud' and '100% criminal fraud'; (c) Porush was 'soon to be proven criminal'; and (d) Stratton
was a 'cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get fired.' "Id.
102. Id. at *3-6. The court also stated that, for these two reasons, Prodigy was distinguish-
able from CompuServe, in Cubby, Inc., in which the court held that CompuServe was a distribu-
tor. Id. The court essentially reasoned that because Prodigy exerted sufficient editorial control
over its bulletin boards, it was more like a newspaper (publisher) than a distributor (library or
news vendor). Id. Furthermore, the court stated, "Let it be clear that this court is in full agree-
ment with Cubby and Auvil. Computer bulletin boards should generally be regarded in the same
context as bookstores, libraries and network affiliates. It is Prodigy's own policies, technology
and staffing decisions which have altered the scenario and mandated the finding that it is a
publisher." Id. at *5. Thus, the court acknowledged that Prodigy was unique among most ISPs.
See Kane, supra note 89, at 494.
103. See Id. at 494.
104. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (indicating that the House
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essentially overruled the Stratton Oakmont, Inc. decision by grant-
ing ISPs immunity from publisher liability. 106
B. The Impact of the CDA on Internet Defamation Cases
Section 230(c) of the CDA, the "Good Samaritan" provision,
provides that an ISP shall not be considered a publisher of any in-
formation provided by an information content provider.10 7 The
"Good Samaritan" provision also indicates that no provider or user
of an interactive computer service shall be held civilly liable for any
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to obscene
or otherwise objectionable material. 108 The CDA attempts to pro-
mote and encourage the continued development and use of the
Internet and technology. 109 Thus, lower courts have used both the
traditional common law framework as well as the "Good Samaritan"
provision to assess defamation cases over the Internet." 0
Lower courts have interpreted the "Good Samaritan" provi-
sion as providing ISPs with a very broad immunity in third-party
Internet defamation cases."' The courts have construed the ISP
immunity broadly, in the spirit of the CDA's stated purpose of pro-
moting rather than impeding technology and Internet use." 2 As
evidenced by the remainder of this section, since the CDA's enact-
ment in 1996, there has not yet been a single case that has held an
ISP liable for disseminating third-party defamatory statements
over the Internet.113
106. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996); see also Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52
(explaining that Congress enacted § 230(c) of the CDA to overrule Stratton Oakmont, Inc.).
107. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
108. § 230(c)(2)(A).
109. § 230(b)(1)-(3).
110. See discussion infra Part III.
111. See generally Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasizing
that the "Good Samaritan" provision of the CDA was intended to grant ISPs immunity from both
distributor and publisher liability due to the policy purpose of promoting technology); Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1132-35 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that the "Good Samaritan"
provision of the CDA provided ISPs immunity from both publisher and distributor liability, and
therefore, AOL was not liable for failing to remove defamatory statements from its bulletin board
after gaining knowledge of the defamation); Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 542
(N.Y. 1999) (holding that the Zeran court's broad interpretation of the "Good Samaritan" immu-
nity granted to ISPs under the CDA should be upheld).
112. See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1131-35.
113. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
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1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia's
1997 decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. established the trend
of granting ISPs broad immunity from defamation liability under §
230(c) of the CDA. 114 In Zeran, Mr. Kenneth Zeran sued AOL for
failing to remove defamatory notices about him that were posted on
an AOL message board after AOL had been informed about the no-
tices. 115 Zeran sued AOL for negligence under the distributor liabil-
ity theory that distributors of information are liable for disseminat-
ing material that they knew or should have known was defamatory
in character. 116 AOL responded to Zeran's suit by filing a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the enactment of the CDA
preempted Zeran's state tort action and mandated that AOL be
granted "Good Samaritan" immunity. 117 AOL's motion did not con-
tend, however, that Zeran did not allege the elements of distributor
liability; the motion rather relied solely on the CDA. 118 The district
court granted AOL's motion and held that AOL was not liable for
failing to remove the defamatory notices due to the "Good Samari-
tan" immunity granted to ISPs.119
The district court in Zeran substantiated its holding by indi-
cating that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution mandates
that federal laws, like the CDA, preempt state laws when state law
directly conflicts with federal law.' 20 The court identified three
types of conflicts that give rise to preemption: (1) the impossibility
of compliance with state and federal law, (2) the conflict between
the state law and the language of the federal statute, and (3) when
the state tort liability conflicts with the purposes and objectives of a
federal statute. 121 The first type of preemption conflict arises when
compliance with both federal and state regulation is "a physical im-
possibility."'122 The court dismissed this type of preemption problem
by stating that an ISP can comply with the CDA even if it is sub-
jected to state liability for negligent distribution of defamatory ma-
114. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1132-35.
115. See supra notes 1-22 and accompanying text.
116. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1128.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1136.
120. Id. at 1129.
121. See id. at 1131-33; see also Sheridan, supra note 46, at 163-65.
122. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1131 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)).
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terial; thus, there is no physical impossibility of compliance be-
tween the CDA and state tort law.
123
Instead, the court focused more heavily on the second type of
preemption conflict, asserting that state tort distributor liability
principles conflicted directly with the "express" language of the
CDA. 124 The court indicated that § 230(c)(1) directly conflicts with
attributing distributor liability to an ISP under state tort law. 125
Section 230(c)(1) provides that "[n]o provider or user of an interac-
tive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content pro-
vider." 126 According to the court, the conflict between the CDA and
applying distributor liability to an ISP arises because distributor
liability is essentially the same thing as publisher liability. 127 The
court indicated that distributor liability-liability for knowingly or
negligently distributing defamatory material-is just a specific type
or degree of publisher liability. 28 Therefore, since § 230(c) of the
CDA granted ISP immunity from publisher liability, ISPs should be
immune from distributor liability as well.129 Relying upon both sec-
tion 577 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts130 and the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Tacket v. General Motors Corp., the court con-
cluded that a distributor is a type of publisher.' 3' Furthermore, the
court indicated that these two authorities revealed that distributor
liability treats a distributor as a "publisher" of third-party state-
ments when that distributor knew or had reason to know that the
statements were defamatory. 3 2 Thus, according to the court, an at-
tempt to impose distributor liability upon AOL is, in effect, an at-
123. Id. at 1132.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999). For the CDA's definition of an "interactive com-
puter service," see supra note 41 and accompanying text. AOL qualifies as an interactive com-
puter service system. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1132.
127. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1132-33.
128. Id. at 1132.
129. Id. at 1132-33.
130. For a description of section 577 of the Restatement (Second) of Tort, see supra notes 59-
60. Relying on the Restatement's definition of a publication, the Zeran court concluded that the
law treats a publisher as both one who intentionally communicates defamatory information and
one who fails to take reasonable steps to remove defamatory statements under his control. See
958 F. Supp. at 1133.
131. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1132-33. In Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042, 1046
(7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit held that one who intentionally and unreasonably failed to
remove defamatory material constituted the publisher of the content of the information. Zeran,
958 F. Supp. at 1133.
132. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1133.
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tempt to treat AOL as the publisher of defamatory material.' 33 In
other words, the state law's classification of AOL as a "publisher" of
defamatory material is contrary to § 230(c)(1), and therefore, the
CDA preempted Zeran's claim for the negligent distribution of the
notice on the AOL message board.
134
Lastly, the Zeran court discussed the third type of preemp-
tion, 13 5 finding that state law distributor liability can also be pre-
empted by the CDA if the state law stands "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in
passing [section] 230 of the CDA."'13 6 Thus, the court held that dis-
tributor liability frustrates the purpose of the CDA, and therefore,
the CDA preempts any state tort law liability.137 The court reasoned
that imposing distributor liability upon an ISP would, in effect,
make it less likely that an ISP would edit or block the content of its
bulletin boards. 1
38
In conclusion, the Zeran court acknowledged that, while the
CDA does not preempt all state law causes of action concerning
ISPs, it did indeed preempt Zeran's claim because his negligent dis-
tributor liability cause of action conflicts with the express language
and purposes of the CDA. 13 9
Zeran appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 140 The Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's decision, affirming that ISPs that
distribute and disseminate defamatory material fall within the tra-
ditional definition of publisher, and therefore, are protected by §
230(c) immunity. 141 The court emphasized that distributors belong
to the larger category of publisher, which has a minimum knowl-
edge requirement as a prerequisite to liability. 42 Indicating that
distributors should be regarded as mere conduits, the Fourth Cir-
cuit explained that distributors should be subjected to a different
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1134.
136. Id. The purpose of the CDA is "to encourage the development of technology" and "to re-
move disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children's access to ... inappropriate ... material." Id. (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1996)).
137. Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1134-35.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1135.
140. Zeran, 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 332.
142. Id.
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standard than other types of publishers. 14 3 Accordingly, the court
stated, "this distinction signifies only that different standards of
liability may be applied within the larger publisher category, de-
pending on the specific type of publisher concerned."' 144 Thus, both
the district court and the Fourth Circuit rejected the contention
that distributor liability and publisher liability are two distinct
categories.14
5
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit asserted that the fact that
an ISP is given notice does not transform the ISP from a publisher
to a distributor under the law. 146 According to the court, once an
ISP receives notice of an allegedly defamatory posting, the ISP is
then thrown into the role of publisher because it "must decide
whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting."'147 Thus, an ISP's
actions of removing defamatory material after receiving notice
makes the ISP a publisher rather than a distributor, and § 230(c)
specifically immunizes an ISP from liability for exercising this role
as publisher. 14
8
Addressing policy concerns, the Fourth Circuit noted that
imposing notice-based liability, or distributor liability, upon ISPs
would create incentives for ISPs "to restrict speech and abstain
from self-regulation," which would be in direct contradiction to the
policies that Congress intended to promote in passing the CDA. The
court reasoned that if ISPs were subject to distributor liability,
then ISPs would have an incentive to remove messages upon notifi-
cation, whether or not the contents were defamatory; thus, "liability
upon notice [would have] a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech."'149 Furthermore, notice-based liability would deter ISPs
from regulating the distribution of offensive material over its ser-
vices because any efforts to investigate, screen, or monitor material
would lead to increased liability. 150 The Fourth Circuit hypothesized
that ISPs would avoid facing increased liability by avoiding or re-
fraining from self-regulation.15' Also, the Fourth Circuit noted that
143. Id. While distributors must have knowledge of the existence of a defamatory statement
to be held liable for defamation, this minimum knowledge requirement is not necessary to at-
tribute liability to a publisher. Id. A publisher can be held liable for disseminating defamatory
material if it has editorial control over the content of the material. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 331; Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997).
146. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 332-33.
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due to the large volume of speech communicated over the Internet,
imposing distributor liability upon ISPs would produce an "impos-
sible burden," since they would be faced with "ceaseless choices of
suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liabil-
ity. 15
2
2. The Trend Created by Zeran: Moving Towards Absolute
Immunity for ISPs from Defamation Liability
The Zeran court's broad conceptualization of "publisher" has
become the basis for the application of a broad immunity to ISPs in
Internet defamation claims. Since the Zeran decision, there have
not been an abundance of cases regarding the specific issue of ISP
liability for third-party defamation published over the Internet.
153
Each of the cases that have arisen, however, have followed the
trend established in Zeran of granting ISPs immunity from both
distributor and publisher liability under § 230(c). 154 Because lower
courts have granted ISPs immunity from publisher and distributor
liability, they have essentially granted ISPs absolute immunity
from defamation liability. The only other form of liability that can
be attributed to disseminators of defamatory material is the com-
mon carrier, which is generally exempt from tort liability due to its
lack of discretion over the material. 155 To make matters worse,
152. Id.
153. See Mirmira, supra note 30, at 442. A possible explanation for this could be that many
third-party defamation suits brought against ISPs settle before going to trial.
154. See infra Part III.B.2.a-c. Note that lower courts have also applied the Zeran court's
broad interpretation of the CDA immunity to exempt ISPs from liability in cases in which the
ISP disseminated objectionable material other than defamation over the Internet, even after
receiving notice or having knowledge about the material. See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d
1010, 1025-28 (Fla. 2001) (indicating that because of the federal immunity granted to ISPs under
§ 230(c) of the CDA, AOL was not liable as the negligent distributor or the publisher of pornog-
raphy displayed in one of its "chat rooms" by a third party, even though the ISP had knowledge
of the pornography and failed to remove it); Stoner v. eBay, Inc., No. 305666, 2000 WL 1705637,
at *2-4 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2000) (holding that since eBay qualifies as an "interac-
tive service provider" under the CDA, it is immune from any liability arising from its distribu-
tion, advertisement, or sale of unauthorized "infringing" sound recordings through its online
auction service). But see Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding that § 230(c) does not immunize an ISP from a trademark infringement claim
because § 230(e)(2) of the CDA indicates that the CDA should not limit the intellectual property
laws that attribute distributor liability to ISPs in trademark infringement context). Courts have
also extended § 230(c) immunity to exempt ISPs from liability in breach of contract claims. See
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39-43 (Wash. 2001) (holding that § 230(c) immunity
exempted an online bookseller, which qualified as an ISP, from liability for breach of contract,
defamation, and negligent misrepresentation in a suit that the plaintiff brought against the
bookseller after it failed to remove negative reviews about the plaintiffs book from its website).
155. See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 35 N.Y.S.2d 740, 752-53 (N.Y. 1974).
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lower courts have managed to expand the already broad immunity
granted to ISPs in Zeran by holding that ISPs are immune from
liability, even when they play an active, aggressive role in dissemi-
nating defamatory content. 156 Thus, it appears that lower courts are
moving toward absolute immunity for ISPs.
a. Blumenthal v. Drudge
In 1998, one year after the Zeran decision, a district court in
Blumenthal v. Drudge upheld the Zeran court's broad interpreta-
tion of the CDA's "Good Samaritan" immunity. 15 7 The Blumenthal
court not only followed Zeran with respect to the CDA, but it fur-
ther expanded the broad, almost-absolute immunity granted to
ISPs in Zeran.158 In Blumenthal, plaintiff Sydney Blumenthal sued
both Matt Drudge, the creator of the defamatory statements, and
AOL, the disseminator of the statements. 159 The defamatory state-
ments were displayed through AOL's service connection on an elec-
tronic publication called "The Drudge Report,"1 60 which Matt
Drudge authored. 161 The day before Blumenthal started working as
an aide to President Clinton, The Drudge Report alleged that Blu-
menthal had a "spousal abuse past that has been effectively covered
up."162 AOL played an active role in publishing The Drudge Re-
port 163: (1) AOL and Drudge entered into a written license agree-
ment, which made The Drudge Report available to all members of
AOL's service for a period of one year; 164 and (2) AOL had certain
editorial rights with respect to The Drudge Report, including the
right to remove or make changes to the content.165
Blumenthal sued AOL under the theory that § 230 of the
CDA did not provide immunity to AOL because Drudge was not an
156. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). The broad Zeran immunity was ex-
panded to immunize ISPs from immunity even when distributing defamatory content provided
by the ISPs service partner. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d at 983.
157. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
158. See Kane, supra note 89, at 491; Mirmira, supra note 30, at 444.
159. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 46-47.
160. The Drudge Report is an electronic gossip column published over the Internet, which fo-
cuses on gossip from Hollywood and Washington, D.C. Id.; see also Kane, supra note 89, at 483.
161. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 46-47.
162. Id.; see also Mirmira, supra note 30, at 437.
163. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51. AOL paid Drudge to include The Drudge Report on its
service and actively advertised the Report, which encouraged its subscribers to sign up for AOL




anonymous third party who published a defamatory statement
through AOL's service. 166 Blumenthal emphasized that AOL specifi-
cally contracted with Drudge, and paid him $3,000 a month to pub-
lish The Drudge Report. 167 The court held that AOL was not liable
for disseminating the defamatory statements, due to the broad im-
munity granted to ISPs according to the Zeran court's interpreta-
tion of § 230.168 The court reasoned that because AOL was an ISP, 169
AOL could not be held liable for the defamatory statements of an-
other "information content provider," according to § 230(c)(1) 170 and
§ 230(c)(2). 171 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument that
AOL could be held liable for distributor liability since the text of §
230(c) exempted ISPs only from publisher liability.172 The court in-
dicated that, when Congress used the term "publisher" in § 230(c),
it intended to immunize ISPs from both publisher and distributor
liability. 173
The Blumenthal court not only upheld the Zeran court's
broad interpretation of § 230(c) immunity, but went one step fur-
ther by immunizing ISPs from claims pertaining to the content pro-
vided to the ISP by its service partner, as opposed to content pro-
vided by third-party subscribers. 17 4 Blumenthal expanded ISP im-
munity from defamation liability by applying it to cases in which
the ISP was more than just a passive conduit for the third-party
defamer's postings; and by doing this, the court essentially disre-
garded the ISP's role in disseminating the content, which is gener-
ally the main focus when assessing liability. 175 Based on the statu-
166. Id. at 51-52.
167. Id. at 51.
168. See id. at 50-53.
169. Plaintiffs also conceded that Matt Drudge was an "information content provider" for the
purposes of the CDA. Id. at 50.
170. For the contents of § 230(c)(1), see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
171. CDA § 230(c)(2) states: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of-(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is consti-
tutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)."
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (Supp. V 1999).
172. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52-53.
173. Id.
174. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 658; Kane, supra note 89, at 491; Mirmira,
supra note 30, at 444.
175. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 657-58. In Zeran, the court granted the ISP,
AOL, immunity from defamation liability under § 230(c) of the CDA. Id. The facts in Zeran,
however, were different than those in Blumenthal because in Zeran, AOL acted as a mere con-
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tory language of the CDA and the Zeran holding, the court applied
the "Good Samaritan" immunity to AOL. 176 The court stated that
because Congress made the choice to immunize ISPs, even when
they had an active, aggressive role in making the content available,
the court had no other choice but to find AOL not liable.1
77
b. Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co.
In Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the trend amongst lower courts of granting ISPs
broad immunity from defamation liability.' 78 The Lunney court,
however, relied solely on common law defamation principles, rather
than the CDA, to reach its conclusion.179
In Lunney, a fifteen-year-old prospective Eagle Scout sued
Prodigy for negligently publishing defamatory statements 80 over its
network through fictitious Prodigy accounts opened under Lunney's
name.18' Affirming the Appellate Division's opinion, the court held:
(1) although the messages were not tasteful, they did not amount to
defamation, 182 and (2) even if Prodigy was considered the publisher
of the messages, it was not liable according to the common law
qualified privilege granted to common carriers, such as telephone
companies.18
3
When assessing whether Prodigy was liable for publishing
the allegedly defamatory messages, the court analyzed the e-mail
messages and bulletin board messages separately.'8 4 Regarding the
e-mail messages, the court relied on Anderson v. New York Tele-
phone Co. and asserted that, under common law, an ISP was merely
a passive conduit for the information, similar to a telephone com-
pany, and therefore, was not liable for the transmission of defama-
duit for the defamatory postings; unlike Prodigy, AOL did not play an aggressive role in making
the defamatory content available. Id.
176. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49-53.
177. Id. at 51-52. The court also indicated that if it were writing on a clean slate, it would
rule in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 51.
178. 723 N.E.2d 539, 541-43 (N.Y. 1999).
179. Id.
180. Under Lunney's name, an unknown third party transmitted vulgar e-mail messages en-
titled, "HOW I'M GONNA KILL YOU" to a local scout master. Id. at 540. The impostor also
posted two vulgar messages in Lunney's name on a Prodigy bulletin board. Id.
181. Id. at 539-40.
182. The court reasoned that the e-mail and bulletin board messages could not be considered
defamatory because they did not involve communications that directly defamed the plaintiff. Id.
at 540-41. The messages were not written about the plaintiff, Lunney, but instead they were
ascribed to him. Id. at 541.
183. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 540-42.
184. Id. at 541-42.
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tory material over its service lines.1 8 5 Thus, the court characterized
the ISP as a common carrier, rather than a publisher, and ex-
empted Prodigy from liability for the e-mail messages. 8 6 Regarding
the bulletin board messages, the court stated that Prodigy could not
be considered the publisher of the allegedly defamatory mes-
sages.18 7 The court reasoned that even if Prodigy exercised the
power to exclude vulgar messages from its bulletin board, this still
did not alter the ISP's "passive character in 'the millions of other
messages in whose transmission it did not participate.' "188 Thus, in
the context of bulletin board messages, the court also asserted that
Prodigy was a common carrier, and therefore, was not liable for
defamation.1
8 9
Additionally, the court rejected Lunney's claim that Prodigy
was negligent in failing to prevent an impostor from opening an
account under his name. 190 According to the court, requiring ISPs to
verify applicants would be too burdensome and would open an ISP
to "liability for the wrongful acts of countless potential tortfeasors
committed against countless potential victims." 191
Furthermore, the Lunney court did not invoke the "Good
Samaritan" immunity. 192 The court contended that the case could be
resolved using solely common law principles and policy implica-
tions. 193 Moreover, the Lunney court asserted that this case did not
call for a decision regarding whether the CDA should be interpreted
so as to render an ISP "unconditionally free from notice-based li-
ability," as in the Zeran decision.
194
Even though the Lunney decision did not involve an analysis
and application of § 230(c), Lunney significantly contributed to the
broad immunity granted to ISPs by categorizing ISPs as common
185. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that, according to Anderson, even if Prodigy could be
considered a publisher, it would still be protected by the qualified immunity granted to telephone
companies, in which case the defendant could only be held liable upon the showing of actual
malice. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 542. The court agreed with Prodigy's argument that it is not a publisher because
even though it reserved the right to screen its bulletin board messages, it is not required to do so
and does not normally do so. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 543.
191. Id. This policy purpose of the court, as stated, closely mirrors the underlying policy of
the CDA that technology should not be impeded, and therefore, ISPs should not be subject to
limitless liability. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
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carriers and emphasizing the policy that ISPs should not be subject
to limitless third-party defamation liability. 195
c. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online, Inc.
In 2000, another district court upheld a broad immunity for
ISPs by exempting an ISP from defamation liability, even though
the ISP played an active role in displaying the content. 196 In Ben
Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., the plaintiff com-
pany sued AOL for defamation, alleging that it published inaccu-
rate information about the plaintiffs stock price and share vol-
ume. 197 AOL conducted a "Quotes & Portfolios" service, on which it
made available stock quotation information provided by two inde-
pendent third parties. 198 AOL moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that § 230(c)(1)199 of the CDA provided AOL with immunity
from liability as the "publisher" or "speaker" of the information.
200
The plaintiff argued in response that AOL was not immune from
suit under § 230 because AOL acted both as an "interactive com-
puter service" 201 and an "information content provider,"20 2 because
they participated in the "creation and development" of the stock
quotes. 20 3 The court, however, rejected plaintiffs argument and as-
195. See Mirmira, supra note 30, at 451-52.
196. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000);
see also Jane Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1002-03 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that
both the CDA and common law principles immunize the defendant ISP in a claim in which the
plaintiff sued the ISP for disseminating defamatory material over e-mail, which was created by a
third party who sent the e-mail to about thirty-one addresses in an attempt to "get even" with
the plaintiff who purportedly "stole her man").
197. 206 F.3d at 983.
198. Id. The two independent third parties are S&P ComStock, Inc., a stock quote provider,
and Townsend Analytics, Ltd., a software provider designated by ComStock. Id.
199. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing § 230(c)(1)).
200. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d at 983. Note that the Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co.
court held that § 230(c) immunity exempted AOL from liability both in the form of damages and
injunctive relief. See id. at 983-86. There is a split in the courts regarding the issue of whether §
230(c) immunity applies to injunctive relief. See Morrison v. Am. Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d
930, 934 (N.D. Ind. 2001) ("A review of the various cases addressing whether the statutory im-
munity of Section 230 applies to injunctive relief reveals a disagreement among the various
courts."); see also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(holding that CDA § 230 provides ISPs immunity from actions for damages and not from actions
for declaratory or injunctive relief).
201. For the CDA's definition of an "interactive computer service," see supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
202. The CDA defines "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is respon-
sible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (Supp. V 1999).
203. Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d at 984. The plaintiff argues that defendant, AOL,
deleted some stock symbols or other information from the data base to correct the errors, which
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serted that, by deleting the symbols, AOL simply "made the data
unavailable and did not develop or create the stock quotation in-
formation displayed." 20 4 Thus, the court held that AOL was not an
information content provider, but was an interactive computer ser-
vice that was exempt from publisher liability under § 230.205
The Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. decision is significant be-
cause, like the Blumenthal opinion, it expanded ISP immunity to
situations in which the ISP played an active role in displaying the
defamatory information. Furthermore, the court in Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co., in a sense also broadened the ISP immunity by
narrowly defining 20 6 an information content provider, 20 7 making it
more likely that an ISP will escape liability by being labeled an in-
teractive computer service, 208 rather than an information content
provider.
IV. THE CURRENT PROBLEM
A. The Need for Reassessment
As detailed in Part III, recent common law developed by
lower courts regarding Internet third-party defamation cases has
created a trend that effectively grants ISPs an absolute immunity
from liability.20 9 This presents a problem because this immunity
virtually nullifies Internet defamation cases and prevents a plain-
tiff from receiving compensation for any harm suffered as a result
of the defamation. While it is apparent that Congress and the lower
courts granted such a broad immunity to ISPs, in the vein of pro-
moting rather than impeding the development of technology, it is
unlikely that the intent was to make it practically impossible for an
ISP to be held liable for defamation over the Internet. In their at-
tempt to uphold the policy of promoting technology, lower courts
have overlooked the adverse effect that broadly immunizing ISPs
would have upon some plaintiffs in defamation cases. Thus, the
constitutes the "creation or development" of information and transforms the defendant ISP to an
"information content provider." Id. at 985.
204. Id. at 985-86.
205. Id. at 983.
206. The court in Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. essentially stated that deleting statements
alone did not make an ISP an information content provider under the CDA. Id. at 985-86.
207. For the CDA's definition of an "information content provider," see supra note 202.
208. For the CDA's definition of an "interactive computer service," see supra note 41 and ac-
companying text.
209. See discussion supra Part III.
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common law regarding Internet defamation law needs to be refor-
mulated to balance more properly the two competing policies of pro-
viding the tort plaintiff with a remedy and ensuring that technology
is not impeded.
B. Painting a Picture of the Problem-Understanding the Elements
and Technology Involved
There are three parties involved in a third-party Internet
defamation case: the plaintiff,210 the unknown third party, 211 and
the ISP.212 Third-party Internet defamation cases brought against
ISPs are usually analyzed on a case-by-case basis because the li-
ability of the ISP is dependent upon the role that the ISP plays in
disseminating the defamation in each specific case. Analysis of the
case also focuses on the Internet medium over which the defama-
tion is displayed, whether it be through e-mail, on a bulletin board,
or in a chat room. This is because an ISP's control over the dissemi-
nation and content of the information varies in these different con-
texts.
1. E-mail
On the Internet,213 there are three main forums over which
defamation can be displayed: e-mail, a bulletin board, and a chat
room.214 An ISP is involved in the dissemination of information in
all three of these contexts. 215
E-mail has been referred to as "the day's evolutionary hybrid
of traditional telephone line communications and regular postal
service mail."216 To transmit an e-mail message, one must have ac-
210. The plaintiff is the victim of the defamatory statement.
211. The unknown third party is the creator and poster of the defamatory material over the
Internet. Usually, the plaintiff is unable to sue the unknown third party because of the difficul-
ties arising from trying to find out the party's identity.
212. The ISP plays the role of distributing the defamation by providing the service by which
a third party can publish information. Generally, a plaintiff will choose to sue an ISP for defama-
tion published over the Internet because the identity of the creator is unknown and the plaintiff
seeks to sue the entity with the "deep pockets."
213. One commentator described the Internet as a collection of thousands of local, regional,
and global interconnected computer networks that "enable users to share digital information,
search for data, and communicate electronically with one another." Douglas B. Luftman, Defa-
mation Liability for On-Line Services: The Sky Is Not Falling, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1071, 1077
(1997).
214. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (N.Y. 1999); Luftman, supra
note 213, at 1080-83; Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53.
215. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541-42.
216. Id. at 541.
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cess to an ISP's e-mail system and must know the recipient's per-
sonal e-mail address. 217 A person can then transmit an e-mail mes-
sage by sending it through the telephone lines to a recipient's elec-
tronic mailbox in the computer e-mail system. 218 Once a message is
sent, the recipient receives it instantly.219 The recipient can then
forward the message, or reply in a similar manner. 220 A commercial
ISP, such as AOL, transmits the private e-mail messages, but does
not exert editorial control over the distribution of the e-mail. 221
Therefore, ISPs are usually absolved of any potential third-party
defamation liability transmitted through e-mail.
222
2. Bulletin Boards
An electronic bulletin board or message board is a forum
where people who log on to the board from their computers, through
an ISP connection, can post messages or information. 223 A bulletin
board has been defined as "storage media," such as a computer
memory or hard disk, that is controlled by a computer and is con-
nected to a telephone line through a modem. 224 The user can either
compose a message while connected to the ISP's service, or upload a
previously composed message onto the bulletin board. 225 The mes-
sage can be posted in one of three manners: (1) it can be posted im-
mediately and can be made available on the server to people with
access to the bulletin board, (2) it can be delayed briefly to prevent
the bulletin board from becoming a chat room, 226 or (3) it can be ed-
ited or removed from publication. 227 Technology enables an ISP, or
message board operator, to read every message before posting it on
the board, if it so chooses. 228 Thus, an electronic bulletin board may
resemble a newspaper's editorial page or may be closer to a chat
room, depending on the way the ISP chooses to operate the board. 229
217. Luftman, supra note 213, at 1081.
218. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541.
219. Luftman, supra note 213, at 1081.
220. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541.
221. Luftman, supra note 213, at 1081; Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541.
222. Luftman, supra note 213, at 1081; Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541-42.
223. Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152.
224. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542.
225. Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53.
226. "Chat rooms" are forums on the Internet provided by ISPs that allow multiple users "to
talk" or communicate online through simultaneous text postings. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542 n.4.
227. Sheridan, supra note 46, at 153.
228. Id.
229. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542.
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In many respects, an electronic bulletin board functions the same
way as a traditional thumbtacks and plywood bulletin board except




Operationally, a chat room is similar to a bulletin board.
23'
They both provide forums over the Internet through ISP services
where a user can post a message that can be read by other users
subscribing to the forum. 232 The main difference between a chat
room and an electronic bulletin board is that the messages posted
in a chat room are automatically displayed-they are not delayed
briefly before being posted, which is available on a bulletin board. 2
33
A chat room allows multiple users to "chat" or "talk" over the Inter-
net through the use of simultaneous text postings, which appear
instantly. 234 Because the messages in a chat room instantly appear
on the screen, the ISP has less editorial control over what is pub-
lished than it may have on one of its bulletin boards. 235
C. The Problem with Applying Defamation Principles in the Internet
Context
Generally, lower courts have attempted to approach the
problem of how to analyze Internet third-party defamation cases by
applying common law defamation principles to the Internet con-
text.236 Two main problems that arise when trying to do this: (1)
analogizing ISPs to the three common law categories for dissemina-
tors (publisher, distributor, and common carrier) can be difficult
230. Id.
231. Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542 n.4.
235. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542; Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53. Nothing in the technol-
ogy of a chat room, however, prevents an ISP from removing or editing a defamatory statement
after it is published by a user and the ISP is informed of the statement. Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at
542.
236. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding
that CompuServe was a distributor); Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541-42 (holding that Prodigy was
exempt from liability because it was comparable to a common carrier under Anderson, case
precedent involving a telephone company which established that common carriers are not liable
for the dissemination of defamatory statements); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,




because ISPs share similarities with each category; and (2) even if
the courts categorize ISPs in one of the three common law catego-
ries, the categorization is not applicable to all contexts since ISPs
exert different amounts of control in different areas of the Internet
(e-mail, chat rooms, bulletin boards). Thus, ISPs are categorized
inconsistently, and precedent regarding third-party Internet defa-
mation cases does not offer much guidance.
For example, ISPs resemble telephone companies because in
the e-mail context they generally have no editorial control over the
content of statements. 237 In the bulletin board and chat room con-
text, however, some ISPs may exert a degree of editorial control
over the messages posted, and therefore, may not be analogous to
telephone companies. ISPs are also similar to newspapers because
the material printed over both of these mediums mass produces in-
formation and makes it publicly available. Because newspapers and
the Internet are so pervasive in our society, defamatory material
published on these mediums is likely to be read by a large number
of people, and therefore, may cause the victim greater harm.238 Also,
in the bulletin board context, an ISP has the technology to exert
editorial control over what is published and is therefore comparable
to a newspaper as well.
23 9
Furthermore, ISPs are comparable to the third medium of
distributors, which lie in between the two extremes of newspapers
and telephone companies. ISPs are similar to distributors, such as
libraries, bookstores, and news vendors, because they disseminate
information and materials without first examining the content.
240
Also, all of these entities have the power to remove or refrain from
distributing defamatory material once they have knowledge of the
defamation. 241 Like the other established distributors, ISPs have
some control over the content they distribute, and therefore, they fit
into the category of distributors as well.
242
237. See Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541-42.
238. Greater harm will be caused because more people will be exposed to false, disparaging
statements about the victim, which will spoil the victim's reputation. See Robert Langdon, The
Communications Decency Act § 230: Make Sense? Or Nonsense-A Private Person's Inability to
Recover if Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 829, 829-31 (1999). The tarnishing of
the victim's reputation may, in turn, have a negative impact upon other aspects of the victim's
life, such as his or her employment and well-being. Id.
239. See Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53.
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The inconsistency and confusion caused by applying common
law defamation principles to third party Internet defamation cases
is exemplified in Cubby, Inc., Stratton Oakmont, Inc., and Lun-
ney. 243 In Cubby, Inc., the court held that an ISP that ran a comput-
erized database was most comparable to a distributor, and there-
fore, should be subject to distributor liability.244 In Stratton Oak-
mont, Inc., the court held that Prodigy should be subject to pub-
lisher liability for the defamation displayed on its service because
Prodigy exerted editorial control over the information published.
245
In Lunney, however, the court held that the same ISP, Prodigy,
should be exempt from defamation liability both in the e-mail and
bulletin board context because Prodigy was comparable to a tele-
phone company, or common carrier, and had no editorial control
over the information.
246
D. The Problems Arising From the Ambiguities in the CDA
After the enactment of the CDA in 1996, most lower courts
analyzed third-party Internet defamation cases brought against
ISPs by granting ISPs "Good Samaritan" immunity under §
230(c). 247 Although this immunity is applicable to ISPs in third-
party defamation suits, the statute is ambiguous as to how broadly
the immunity should be applied. The plain language of the CDA
indicates that an ISP should not be considered a publisher, and
therefore, should be immune from publisher liability. 248 The CDA
does not expressly immunize ISPs from distributor liability.
249
Thus, § 230(c) immunity can be interpreted in two different ways.
250
First, a narrow interpretation calls for only immunizing ISPs from
publisher liability. 25 1 Second, a broad interpretation requires im-
munizing ISPs from both publisher and distributor liability, since a
distributor can be categorized as a republisher, which falls within
the overarching publisher category.
25 2
243. See discussion supra Parts III.A, III.B.2.b.
244. See 776 F. Supp. at 139-40.
245. 1995 WL 323710, at *3-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
246. Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (N.Y. 1999).
247. See discussion supra Part III.B. The Lunney court is the exception, because it used
solely common law principles to analyze the case and still exempted the ISP from liability. See
discussion supra Part III.B.2.b.
248. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
249. See id.





Lower courts attempted to solve this problem by adopting a
broad interpretation of the CDA immunity, which began with Ze-
ran.253 The problem is that this trend has essentially led to an abso-
lute immunity for ISPs in third-party Internet defamation suits,
which has the adverse effect of nullifying defamation suits against
ISPs in the Internet context. 254 Another problem created by the
blanket immunity provided to ISPs is that it has left no incentive
for ISPs to monitor or edit their content, or maintain records of
their users so that plaintiffs can identify the authors of the defama-
tory statements and seek redress. 255 Arguably, the creation of an
absolute immunity for ISPs is the result of a misinterpretation of
the CDA immunity and Congress's intent under the statute.
V. A BETTER SOLUTION
Since 1996, lower courts have used both the CDA and com-
mon law defamation principles to grant ISPs a blanket immunity
from third-party defamation suits. 256 Section 230(c) immunity has
been interpreted to exempt ISPs from both publisher and distribu-
tor liability, even in situations in which the ISP played an aggres-
sive role in the distribution of the information or had knowledge of
the defamatory statements but failed to remove them.257 Even when
courts resorted to common law defamation principles, the ISP was
still not held liable for the dissemination of defamatory material
under the common carrier exception. 258 For the reasons stated in
the previous section,259 lower courts' approach to ISP liability for
third-party defamation on the Internet needs to be changed. A bet-
ter solution calls for applying a broad immunity to ISPs with the
following three restrictions: (1) immunity granted under § 230(c) of
the CDA should only immunize ISPs from publisher liability, not
distributor liability; (2) ISPs that are notified of defamatory state-
ments on the Internet over which they can exert some editorial con-
trol should be subject to distributor liability for failing to remove
the statements within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) ISPs
that disseminate defamatory material created by a service partner,
253. See discussion supra Part III.B.
254. See discussion supra Parts III.B.2, W.A.
255. Mirmira, supra note 30, at 453.
256. See discussion supra Part III.B.
257. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp.
44, 49-53 (D.D.C. 1998).
258. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (N.Y. 1999).
259. See discussion supra Parts IV.A, D.
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rather than an unknown third party, should not be automatically
exempt from liability under section 230.260 This proposal will help
prevent ISP immunity from turning into an absolute immunity.
The solution this Note proposes is better than the trend cre-
ated in lower courts because: (1) it is based on a more accurate in-
terpretation of the CDA's purpose; (2) its application of the CDA
immunity requires the use of common law defamation principles in
the analysis as opposed to applying CDA immunity independently
or in lieu of the common law principles; (3) it allows for a better
balancing of the crucial policy matters involved; and (4) it is in line
with the policies and approaches involved in other types of law that
are commonly applied to the Internet context, namely copyright
law.
A. Interpretation of the CDA Immunity
The CDA immunity granted to ISPs in third-party Internet
defamation suits comes from § 230(c), titled "Protection for 'Good
Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material."261 This
"Good Samaritan" immunity essentially exempts ISPs from pub-
lisher liability.262 The CDA is ambiguous, however, as to how
broadly this immunity should be applied to ISPs, or more specifi-
cally, if it should apply to publishers only or if it should apply to
both publishers and distributors. 263 Lower courts applying this law
have all followed the Zeran court's interpretation of the "Good Sa-
maritan" immunity, indicating that, under the CDA, ISPs should be
immunized from both publisher and distributor liability in the
defamation context. 264 The court in Zeran reached its conclusion
regarding the CDA's intent by looking at two factors: (1) the plain
language of the statute coupled with an understanding of common
law defamation principles, and (2) the purposes and objectives of
the CDA. 265 A closer analysis of these two factors, however, leads to
the conclusion that the Zeran court may have misinterpreted the
260. ISPs that disseminate defamatory material can be subject to two kinds of liability under
the proposed solution: (1) they can be considered an "information content provider" and be sub-
ject to liability as the creator of the defamatory material, or (2) they can be subject to distributor
liability as an ISP, or an "interactive computer service" under the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-
(3) (Supp. V 1999).
261. § 230(c).
262. § 230(c)(1).
263. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1131-35 (4th Cir. 1997).
264. See discussion supra Part III.B.
265. 958 F. Supp. at 1131-35.
679
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
CDA. Arguably, these two factors demonstrate that the CDA im-
munity was meant to immunize ISPs from publisher liability only.
1. Plain Language of the Statute Coupled with a Correct
Understanding of Common Law Defamation Principles
The Zeran court asserted that subjecting ISPs to distributor
liability would directly conflict with the language of the CDA be-
cause a distributor is, in effect, a type of publisher, and § 230(c) ex-
pressly immunizes ISPs from publisher liability. 266 Thus, the court
rejected the argument that distributor liability should be consid-
ered independently from publisher liability because distributors
were distinct from publishers. 267 As support for its assertion, the
court indicated that section 577 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the Seventh Circuit stated that an entity which intentionally
and unreasonably fails to remove material that it knows or has rea-
son to know is defamatory should be subject to liability for its con-
tinued publication. 268 Simply because the word "publication" was
used by these two sources, the court concluded that distributors
belonged within the larger category of publisher. 269 According to the
court, a proper understanding of distributor liability treats a dis-
tributor as a "publisher" of third-party statements when the -dis-
tributor had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the
statements were defamatory. 270
The Zeran court's characterization of distributor liability
does not reflect a "proper understanding" of common law defama-
tion principles because it ignores the fact that in the common law of
libel the publisher/distributor distinction has existed for many
years. 271 While a distributor has similarities to a publisher, and is
occasionally called a secondary publisher, the common law has al-
ways considered the categories of publisher and distributor as two
separate categories subject to two independent types of liability.272
The common law created the distinction between a publisher and
266. Id. at 1132-33.




271. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); R. James
George, Jr. & James A. Hemphill, Defamation Liability and the Internet, in 18TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW 1998, at 694 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G4-4042, 1998); Langdon, supra note 238, at 840-42.
272. See George & Hemphill, supra note 271, at 694; Kane, supra note 89, at 486; Langdon,
supra note 238, at 841; Sheridan, supra note 46, at 153-54.
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distributor based on the common sense policy that a publisher has a
higher degree of involvement in the dissemination of defamatory
material and should therefore be subject to a separate, higher stan-
dard of liability.2 3 The purpose behind this characterization is re-
flected in section 581 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, titled
"Transmission of Defamation Published by a Third Person. 274 This
section states:
(1) Except as stated in subsection (2), one who only delivers or transmits defama-
tory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he
knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.
(2) One who broadcasts defamatory matter by means of radio or television is sub-
ject to the same liability as an original publisher.
275
Thus, section 581 makes it clear that a distributor, or one
who delivers or transmits defamatory material published by a third
party, is subject to a liability that is separate and distinct from pub-
lisher liability.276 Section 581(1) of the Restatement addresses the
notice liability that distributors are held accountable for while sec-
tion 581(2) offers two exceptions to the rule. Furthermore, com-
ments b, d, and e to section 581 indicate that distributors, such as
libraries, news vendors, and bookstores, are to be included under
section 581(1), and should therefore not be liable as publishers. 277
Section 578 of the Restatement also substantiates the asser-
tion that publisher and distributor liability are two independent,
distinct sources of liability.278 Section 578 states: "Except as to
those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third
person, one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory mat-
ter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it."279
Thus, section 578 acknowledges that a distributor who only delivers
273. See George & Hemphill, supra note 271, at 694.
274. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977); George & Hemphill, supra note 271, at
694.
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 (1977).
276. See id.
277. Id. § 581 cmts. b, d, e. Comment (g) indicates that radio and television broadcasters are
excluded from the distributor category described in section 581(1) because they are more similar
to publishers in the sense that they not only distribute the material, but also have some control
over the selection of the content displayed. Id. § 581 cmt. g. Thus, section 581 indicates that
radio and television broadcasters are subject to publisher liability, while other transmitters of
third-party defamation, such as libraries and bookstores, should be subject to distributor liabil-
ity. Id. § 581 cmts. e, g. ISPs more likely resemble the distributor category because unlike radio
and television broadcasters, they do not participate in the selection of the content that a third
party chooses to display over the Internet.
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
279. Id.
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or transmits the defamatory material published by a third party
should be exempted from publisher liability. 280 Section 578 also
serves to rebut the Zeran court's argument that the common law
indicates that one who fails to remove defamatory material of which
he has knowledge is considered to be a republisher that is subject to
publisher liability. Rather, section 578 arguably indicates that
while a distributor, who merely disseminates or transmits defama-
tory material, may be considered a republisher in some contexts, it
is not to be subjected to publisher liability. 28 1 Thus, section 578 em-
phasizes that a distributor should be subjected to a notice-based
distributor liability, not publisher liability. 28 2 A proper understand-
ing of defamation common law, therefore, indicates that distributor
and publisher liability are to be considered separately.
The Zeran court's interpretation of the CDA not only mis-
characterizes the defamation common law, but it also assumes that
Congress had the same oversight. The distinction between a pub-
lisher and distributor is a well-understood distinction that has been
around for many years. 283 Undoubtedly, Congress was aware of this
distinction when it enacted § 230(c) of the CDA. If Congress in-
tended for ISPs to be immunized from distributor liability as well
as publisher liability, it would have included the word "distributor"
in the plain language of the immunity under § 230(c). 28 4 Thus, the
fact that section 230(c) only states that ISPs should not be liable as
the publisher of information that it did not create indicates that the
immunity should exempt ISPs solely from publisher liability.
The Zeran decision states that its broad application of CDA
immunity stems from the intent of the plain language of the statute
and an understanding of common law defamation principles. 28 5 A
more careful analysis of the common law and the statute, however,
demonstrates that the Zeran decision is actually more a reflection
of the court's desire to promote technology and apply the ISP im-
munity broadly, rather than an accurate interpretation of the stat-




283. See supra Part II.
284. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 660-61; Sheridan, supra note 46, at 168. Both
of these commentators acknowledge the supported by this Note as a valid criticism of Zeran.
285. 1124, 1131-35 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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2. The Purposes and Objectives of the CDA
The Zeran court also granted ISPs broad immunity from
both publisher and distributor liability under the premise that ap-
plying the immunity broadly coincided with the purposes and objec-
tives that Congress had in mind when enacting the CDA.286 The
court stated that both the plain language of the CDA and its legis-
lative history indicate that Congress enacted the CDA to prevent
ISPs from being held liable as publishers for restricting access to
objectionable material created by third parties. 2 7 According to Ze-
ran, attributing distributor liability to ISPs would serve as an ob-
stacle to the achievement of Congress's goal because ISPs are less
likely to edit or block defamatory material if an attempt to do so
can serve as a basis for liability.288 The Zeran court reasoned that
distributors of information are held liable if they had knowledge or
should have had knowledge of the defamatory nature of statements
made by a third party.289 When ISPs attempt to monitor content,
they are more likely to know or have a reason to know of defama-
tory material on their servers.290 Thus, the Zeran court hypothe-
sized that being subject to distributor liability would cause many
ISPs to refrain from implementing monitoring policies 291 in an at-
tempt to avoid the implication that the ISP had knowledge or rea-
son to know about alleged defamatory material. 292
The Zeran court's conclusion is weakly supported. The stated
policy objectives in the plain language and the legislative history of
the CDA actually compel the conclusion that Congress intended for
ISPs to remain subject to distributor liability in certain contexts.
Section 230(b) states that "[i]t is the policy of the United States" to:
286. Id. at 1134-35.
287. Id. at 1134. The Zeran court also noted that § 230(b) states that it is the policy of the
United States:
"[T]o encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control
over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use
the Internet and other interactive computer services; [and] . . . to remove disin-
centives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technolo-
gies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material ......




291. Examples of some monitoring policies that ISPs use are maintaining a record of sub-
scribers who persist in posting objectionable material or providing hotline services where users
can report objectionable content. See id. at 1135.
292. Id.
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(1) "encourage the development of technologies that maximize user
control over what information is received" over the Internet, and (2)
"remove disincentives [for ISPs to] develop[] and utiliz[e] .. . block-
ing and filtering technologies" in order to facilitate the screening of
"objectionable" material displayed over the Internet.293 In other
words, in enacting the CDA, Congress intended to create incentives
for ISPs to screen and edit the content of information displayed
over the Internet. 294 If ISPs were immune from both publisher and
distributor liability in third-party defamation claims, they would
essentially be given blanket immunity from liability. 295 This inter-
pretation of the "Good Samaritan" immunity, which is advocated in
Zeran, would frustrate, rather than follow, the purpose of the CDA.
Congress intended to encourage ISPs to monitor the content on the
Internet, but if ISPs are granted absolute immunity for disseminat-
ing third-party defamatory material, then ISPs will not bother to
screen their content at all because they will never be subject to li-
ability. 296 If, on the other hand, ISPs could be held liable as a dis-
tributor for neglecting to monitor information or failing to remove
objectionable content that is brought to their knowledge, then ISPs
would have a greater incentive to screen content. Common sense
dictates that an ISP will not waste its time and money monitoring
content over the Internet when it will suffer no repercussions from
failing to do so. Thus, immunizing ISPs from distributor liability
would frustrate Congress's objectives under the CDA much more
than would subjecting ISPs to distributor liability.
Furthermore, the CDA addresses the concerns expressed in
Zeran that applying distributor liability to ISPs may discourage
ISPs from attempting to edit their content. Section 230(c)(2)(A)
states that no ISP or user of an ISP should be held liable for any
action taken in good faith to restrict access voluntarily to material
that they consider to be "obscene . . . or otherwise objectionable. '" 297
Thus, Congress made sure that subjecting ISPs to distributor liabil-
ity would not frustrate its stated purpose of removing disincentives
for ISPs to develop filtering technologies to screen or remove third-
party content over the Internet. If Congress intended for ISPs to be
293. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (Supp. V 1999).
294. See id.
295. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
296. See Mirmira, supra note 30, at 453 ("[Tjhe blanket immunity of the CDA has left no in-
centive for [ISPs] to maintain records of their users to identify the authors of defamatory mes-
sages to allow the plaintiff to seek redress.").
297. § 230(c)(2)(A).
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immunized from both publisher and distributor liability (which
would be the same thing as absolute immunity), it would not have
bothered to put a safe harbor in the CDA for ISPs that may incur
liability as a result of monitoring content.
Yet another indication that Congress did not intend to im-
munize ISPs from distributor liability can be found in the legisla-
tive history of the CDA. Quoting from the legislative history accom-
panying passage of § 230, the court in Zeran noted that " '[o]ne of
the specific purposes of this section is to overrule [Stratton Oak-
mont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.] and any other similar decision
which has treated providers and users as publishers or speakers of
the content that is not their own because they have restricted ac-
cess to objectionable material.' "298 Thus, the legislative history
makes it clear that Congress intended to immunize ISPs from pub-
lisher liability to prevent creating disincentives for ISPs to screen
content. 299 This congressional intent is further emphasized by the
fact that Congress named the CDA immunity section: "Protection
for 'good samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive material."
300
Seemingly, Congress intended to prevent ISPs from incurring liabil-
ity for screening and blocking content over the Internet. Thus,
lower courts' application of the CDA immunity to ISPs in instances
in which the ISP failed to restrict access to objectionable, defama-
tory material after receiving notice seems to contradict Congress's
intent under the CDA.
In Stratton Oakmont, Inc., the court held Prodigy liable as
the publisher of third-party defamation because it engaged in
screening procedures of the content it displayed on its bulletin
board.301 The Stratton Oakmont, Inc. court, however, indicated that
Prodigy was an exception, and generally, ISPs that ran computer
bulletin boards should be subject to distributor liability under the
Cubby, Inc. precedent.30 2 The legislative history of the CDA indi-
cates that Congress only intended to overrule the part of Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. that subjected ISPs to publisher liability. 303 There is
no evidence in the legislative history or the language of the CDA
that Congress intended to overrule the Cubby, Inc. precedent,
298. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (cited in Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958
F. Supp. 1124, 1134 n.21 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
299. See id.
300. § 230(c).
301. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995).
302. Id. at *5.
303. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
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which subjected ISPs to distributor liability, or the portion of Strat-
ton Oakmont, Inc. that upheld Cubby, Inc.3 0 4 If Congress intended §
230(c) to immunize ISPs from distributor liability, the legislative
history would have asserted the intent to overrule Cubby, Inc. as
well as Stratton Oakmont, Inc.3°5 Accordingly, it appears as though
section 230(c) was only meant to immunize ISPs from publisher li-
ability, and not distributor liability.
B. Harmonizing Common Law Defamation Principles with CDA
Immunity
Preserving distributor liability for ISPs has the dual effect of
preventing the broad immunity granted to ISPs from turning into
an absolute immunity and allowing common law defamation princi-
ples to be harmonized with the application of CDA immunity. After
the enactment of the CDA, most lower courts decided third-party
defamation suits brought against ISPs by broadly applying § 230(c)
immunity to exempt ISPs from both publisher and distributor li-
ability. These cases did not involve any application of common law
principles, but instead consisted of a straightforward application of
CDA immunity.306 Applying the common law principle of distributor
liability to ISPs in third-party Internet defamation suits serves the
function of maintaining a balance between promoting technology
and screening information on the Internet and ensuring that tort
plaintiffs are compensated for their injuries.
Furthermore, exposing ISPs to distributor liability in third-
party Internet defamation cases is valuable because, in most con-
texts (with the possible exception of e-mail), ISPs resemble other
distributors of information. In Cubby, Inc., the court held that an
ISP which ran a computerized database should be subject to
distributor liability because it could be considered an electronic
news vendor, which was similar to the traditional distributor cate-
gories of a library, bookstore, or newsstand.30 7 In Stratton Oakmont,
Inc., the court also acknowledged that computer bulletin boards ran
by ISPs should generally be regarded as distributors in the same
304. § 230; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194.
305. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 660-61 (noting that other commentators have
also made this argument).
306. See discussion supra Part III.B. The Lunney court is the exception to the lower courts'
trend of broadly applying the CDA immunity to ISPs without applying any common law defama-
tion principles. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.b. In Lunney, the court used solely common law
principles and held that the ISP, Prodigy, was exempt from liability as a common carrier in both
the e-mail and bulletin board context. See Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. Co, 723 N.E.2d 539, 541-43
(N.Y. 1999).
307. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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ISPs should generally be regarded as distributors in the same con-
text as bookstores, libraries, and network affiliates. 3°
In the bulletin board and chat room context, ISPs most
closely resemble distributors, rather than publishers or common
carriers. In these contexts, ISPs basically deliver or transmit the
information over the Internet without exerting editorial control
over the material before it is displayed. 30 9 Like other distributors,
however, ISPs do have the technology to remove or edit information
that they know or should have known is defamatory. 310 ISPs are
different from newspaper publishers because they do not generally
edit all of the material they publish or distribute, and they usually
play no role in the selection or creation of the material's content.
Because ISPs have some control or ability to remove or screen ma-
terial that is displayed on bulletin boards or chat rooms, however,
they cannot be considered common carriers of the information.3 11
ISPs can realistically be characterized as distributors in many
Internet contexts. Therefore, there is certainly great value in re-
taining distributor liability for ISPs in third-party Internet defama-
tion suits.
C. Balancing Policy Matters
In assessing whether ISPs should be held liable for defama-
tory statements published by unknown third parties over the Inter-
net, policy considerations are crucial. On one hand, there is a con-
cern that imposing liability on ISPs would impede the progression
of technology. Holding ISPs liable for every defamatory statement
printed over the Internet would put some ISPs out of business and
308. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995). The court held that the ISP, Prodigy, was a publisher of the information rather than a
distributor because it had increased editorial control over the information. Id. The court noted,
however, that Prodigy was an exception and that most ISPs that ran computer bulletin boards
should be subject to distributor liability rather than publisher liability. Id.
309. See Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53. Some ISPs do have screening policies in which
they exert editorial control over the material before it is displayed. Id. These policies do not in-
sure that all of the material has been screened due to the sheer volume of information over the
Internet. See Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 541-42.
310. See Sheridan, supra note 46, at 152-53.
311. See Anderson v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 345 N.Y.S.2d 740, 751-53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (Witmer,
J., dissenting). In Lunney, the court held that in the e-mail context, ISPs should be considered
common carriers because they act as passive conduits with no editorial control over the private e-
mail messages. 723 N.E.2d at 541-42. The court in Lunney also indicated that ISPs remain pas-
sive in the bulletin board context and should be considered common carriers in that context as
well. Id. This Note disagrees with characterizing ISPs as common carriers in the bulletin board
and chat room context because ISPs have the technology and editorial control to remove informa-
tion that they know or should know is defamatory.
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cause others to shut down their chat rooms, message boards, or e-
mail services in order to avoid paying large damage awards. In ei-
ther instance, the use of the Internet would be severely limited.
Thus, holding ISPs liable for third-party defamation on the Internet
would impede technology and be detrimental to the functioning of
an advanced society.3 1 2 On the other hand, because the Internet is
so widely used, more and more third-party defamation cases are
arising. If ISPs are totally immune from liability, many plaintiffs
will have no remedy for the harm that they suffer. These two policy
considerations need to be balanced properly when considering the
issue of ISP liability for third-party Internet defamation.
In those instances that ISPs have some control over the
situation, in the sense that they can mitigate the effects of the
situation by preventing defamation from continuing, ISPs who have
knowledge of the defamation should be subject to distributor liabil-
ity. Distributor liability is different than publisher liability because
distributors generally do not exert any editorial control over mate-
rials they distribute, and thus, they are not held liable for the dis-
semination of defamatory materials unless they first had notice or
knowledge of the defamation.313 While subjecting ISPs to distributor
liability may have the effect of increasing costs for ISPs, 314 it is bet-
ter than providing a broad blanket immunity that essentially re-
sults in an absolute immunity. Providing a blanket immunity to
ISPs may have the negative consequence of wiping out the exis-
tence of tort defamation claims altogether in the Internet context.
Attempts to avoid impeding technology need to be balanced
against the policy of compensating tort victims for their injuries.
Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to expect a paid service, such
as an ISP, to remove defamatory materials once they know or have
312. See Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 663-64.
313. See supra note 77-80.
314. It is important to note that the costs that distributor liability will impose upon ISPs
may be limited by the fact that the plaintiff still has the burden of first proving that the ISP had
knowledge of or reason to know about the allegedly defamatory material before the ISP incurs
liability. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc, 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Thus, if an
ISP receives notice of allegedly defamatory material and fails to remove it, the ISP will only be
held liable if the plaintiff can offer specific facts indicating that the ISP had knowledge or reason
to know of the defamation; conclusory allegations are insufficient. See id. For example, the
knowledge requirement is not satisfied if the ISP was merely informed that a third party may be
engaged in "hacking" in order to obtain unauthorized access to an online information service run
by the ISP. See id. The burden of proof regarding the notice/knowledge requirement rests upon
the plaintiff, and this fact may limit some of the negative effects of imposing distributor liability
upon ISPs. See id.
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reason to know of its existence. 315 This remedy may be of little cost
or effort to the ISP and allows for a balance between the two com-
peting policy considerations.
In order to ensure that imposing distributor liability upon
ISPs is not unduly burdensome both to ISPs and technology in gen-
eral, courts can apply distributor liability in a manner that may
limit or restrict the liability that the ISP incurs. For example,
courts can provide ISPs with a reasonable amount of time to remove
the defamatory messages after receiving notice, allowing ISPs to
avoid liability.316 Thus, preserving distributor liability in the Inter-
net context provides an effective solution, providing the plaintiff
with a remedy without significantly impeding technology.
D. Analogizing Copyright Law to Defamation Law
Just as ISPs can be held liable for distributing over the
Internet defamatory material that is created and published by third
parties, they can also be held liable for distributing copyrighted ma-
terial communicated over the Internet by a third party without con-
sent.317 In copyright law, a person can be liable for copyright in-
fringement if the plaintiff establishes: (1) ownership of a valid copy-
right, and (2) that the alleged infringer engaged in the actual "copy-
ing" of the material.318 Thus, the person who actually copies the
copyrighted work can be held liable for direct infringement of the
copyright laws.319 A person or entity that participated in the copy-
ing of the material can also be held liable for copyright infringe-
ment, even if it did not directly infringe the plaintiffs works. 320 Un-
der the theory of contributory infringement, those that participate
in the copyright infringement of a third party will be held liable if it
is established that the defendant had knowledge of the infringing
315. Many ISPs already control or screen some of the material published on their servers.
See, e.g., Friedman & Buono, supra note 29, at 664 (stating that while AOL does not prescreen
content, it does aggressively monitor its message boards and chat rooms for offensive or objec-
tionable content). Thus, removing defamatory material would not be too much of an extra effort.
For those ISPs who do not routinely screen or monitor the material on their servers, the cost of
deleting defamatory statements will still be small. Locating and deleting statements takes little
time and effort. Asking ISPs to remove defamatory material once they are informed about its
existence is quite different than asking them to screen for defamatory material online. Further-
more, Congress encourages ISPs to block and screen objectionable content on-line, even though it
may increase costs for ISPs. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. V 1999).
316. See Mirmira, supra note 30, at 453-57.
317. See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
318. Id. at 1366-67.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1373.
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activity and materially contributed to the infringement. 32' For ex-
ample, in Religious Technical Center v. Netcom On-Line Communi-
cation Services, Inc., the court held that Netcom could be held liable
for contributory infringement if it distributed information over the
Internet that it knew or should have known was copyright-infringed
material.3 22 Thus, when applying copyright law to the Internet con-
text, lower courts have upheld the policy that ISPs should be sub-
ject to liability for distributing objectionable material over the
Internet if they had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the
objectionable nature of the information. 323 Therefore, it makes sense
that courts should use the same policy when applying defamation
law to the Internet context. Distributor liability is similar to con-
tributory infringement in the sense that ISPs and other distributors
can be held liable for third-party content that is objectionable if
knowledge of the objectionable nature existed or should have ex-
isted. 324 Analogizing copyright law to defamation law as applied in
the Internet context, therefore, indicates that ISPs should be sub-
ject to distributor liability. 32
5
Accordingly, policy matters, common sense, an understand-
ing of common law defamation principles, congressional intent, and
proper statutory interpretation of the CDA all indicate that this
Note's proposal to preserve distributor liability for ISPs provides
the most practical solution to the problem posed in third-party
Internet defamation cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court needs to reassess the common law
that has been created for defamation in the Internet context. Lower
courts have applied the CDA's "Good Samaritan" immunity for ISPs
so broadly that this immunity has essentially become a blanket
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1374.
323. Id. at 1373. In Religious Technical Center, the court noted that the express language of
the copyright statute does not create a rule of liability for contributory infringement, but that
this theory of liability should still exist because contributory infringement is "merely a species of
the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another." Id. The policy stated in Religious Technical Center can
also be used as grounds to substantiate applying distributor liability, which is similar to con-
tributory infringement, to defamation law in the Internet context.
324. Cf. Religious Technical Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1373; Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
325. Applying the same underlying policies to copyright law and defamation law in the
Internet context will have the overall favorable effect of increasing consistency in cases dealing
with the Internet context.
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immunity that shields ISPs from any liability for defamation by a
third party. 326 Since many publishers of defamatory statements are
unknown users, granting ISPs a total immunity from third-party
Internet defamation suits can have adverse effects. If ISPs are
never held liable for third-party defamation, the plaintiffs that suf-
fer as a result of this defamation will be left with no one to sue and
no remedy for the harms incurred. When applying CDA immunity
to ISPs, the policy of promoting technology needs to be balanced
with the policy that tort plaintiffs should be compensated for their
injuries. The solution this Note sets forth allows for a proper bal-
ancing of policy concerns through the preservation of distributor
liability for ISPs. Thus far, the solution presented by lower courts
allows for the promotion of technology, but neglects to ensure re-
covery for tort plaintiffs. Furthermore, the solution espoused in
lower courts goes against Congress's policy objectives for enacting
the CDA, since immunizing ISPs from third-party defamation li-
ability creates disincentives for ISPs to monitor content.3 27
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